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Abstract: Dynamic electricity pricing can produce efficiency gains in the electricity sector and 
help achieve energy policy goals such as increasing electric system reliability and supporting 
renewable energy deployment. Retail electric companies can offer dynamic pricing to residential 
electricity customers via smart meter-enabled tariffs that proxy the cost to procure electricity on the 
wholesale market. Current investments in the smart metering necessary to implement dynamic 
tariffs show policy makers’ resolve for enabling responsive demand and realizing its benefits. 
However, despite these benefits and the potential bill savings these tariffs can offer, adoption 
among residential customers remains at low levels. Using a choice experiment approach, this paper 
seeks to determine whether disclosing the environmental and system benefits of dynamic tariffs to 
residential customers can increase adoption. Although sampling and design issues preclude wide 
generalization, we found that our environmentally conscious respondents reduced their required 
discount to switch to dynamic tariffs around 10% in response to higher awareness of environmental 
and system benefits. The perception that shifting usage is easy to do also had a significant impact, 
indicating the potential importance of enabling technology. Perhaps the targeted communication 
strategy employed by this study is one way to increase adoption and achieve policy goals. 
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1. Introduction 
The deployment of smart electricity meters – devices that can read and relay consumption at 
discrete time intervals – is progressing quickly. 33% of US households had smart meters as of May 
2012, and nearly two-thirds are expected to have them by 2015 (FERC 2011; IEE 2012). In parts of 
the European Union (EU) the deployment of smart meters is moving even faster (Haney et al. 2009; 
Torriti et al. 2010). Italy has completed its transition; by 2020, France, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
Norway, the UK, and Spain are projected to reach almost 100% deployment (DECC and Ofgem 
2011; Faruqui et al. 2010; Torriti 2012). 
Smart meters enable dynamic electricity pricing: tariffs that allow customers to face the cost 
of procuring electricity in the wholesale market, which varies by time of day and season (Fox-
Penner 2010: 49). Examples are provided in Appendix A.  The main benefit of these market-
reflective tariffs is that they provide price signals for customers to cut demand during peak, high-
priced times (Faruqui and Sergici 2010; Faruqui and Palmer 2012; Filippini 2011). Price-
responsive customers can produce efficiency gains for the electricity sector because they: require 
less infrastructure to generate and distribute power at peak times1; cut electricity procurement costs 
through lower peak prices; and reduce vulnerability to service failures, such as blackouts (Faruqui 
et al. 2010). Responsive demand – via direct customer response or enabling technologies like smart 
appliances, energy storage, and distributed generation (Strbac 2008; Clastres 2011) – becomes 
more valuable if it is “dispatchable”: able to be deployed by the system operator with certainty to 
respond to market conditions. These cost savings can be passed through; switching to these tariffs 
can save money for the majority of customers (Faruqui 2010). 
Responsive demand driven by dynamic pricing can also reduce greenhouse gases and local 
pollutants. Enhanced price signals can cause customers to shift demand away from peak times, 
                                                        
1 Safety margins for peak demand conditions cause some power generation and delivery infrastructure to remain 
unutilized most of the year: 5-12% of power plants serve demand only 1% of the time (Faruqui et al. 2007). 
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avoiding emission-intensive generators used to serve system peak in some regions.2  Customers 
may also cut demand entirely due to enhanced price signals and better consumption information 
from smart metering (PNNL 2010). Demand that can be dispatched is the largest potential source of 
environmental benefits. Responsive, dispatchable demand would be able to support higher levels of 
intermittent renewable generation without compromising reliability (Delucchi and Jacobson 2011). 
The CO2 reductions of smart metering and dynamic pricing, and resulting demand response have 
been quantified in studies, some specific to the US (EPRI 2008; Hledik 2009), others global in 
scope (IEA 2010; Webb 2008). They show modest direct benefits, at maximum around 5% of total 
emissions in 2030. Renewable energy deployment in the 25-40% range supported by a smarter grid 
can deliver another 5-10% of cuts in CO2 emissions (PNNL 2010). 
Despite these environmental and system (E&S) benefits and potential bill savings, in the 
UK only about 15% of customers opt for a simple dynamic Time of Use tariff with a peak and off-
peak price (Faruqui and Palmer 2012). On the other hand, in a US pilot when dynamic tariffs were 
the default only 10% opted out (Herter 2007). Other studies have confirmed this status quo bias 
(MMI 2003). An on-going research programme by the US Department of Energy (2013) also 
highlights the higher recruitment rates for default offers (78% to 87%) in contrast to opt-in methods 
(5% to 28%). Low uptake does not bode well for smart metering’s cost effectiveness. In the EU, 
smart meters’ cost is only justified when dynamic tariffs are offered and customers switch to them 
at higher levels than traditionally experienced (Faruqui et al. 2010). 
Since it may be legally or politically impossible to make dynamic pricing the default option, 
experts on both sides of the Atlantic (Faruqui et al. 2010; Torriti et al. 2011) have suggested that 
informing customers about the E&S benefits of dynamic pricing could break this status quo bias 
and increase switching rates. This short paper uses a survey-based choice experiment to determine 
the effect of E&S benefits information on household preferences for dynamic pricing.                                                          2 This direct benefit depends on peak and off-peak generation mix. For example, shifting demand from coal to natural 
gas is beneficial, while the opposite is not. Hledik 2009 (p. 11) provides an example of two different load shifting 
scenarios in the United States. We also note that reducing demand completely is not subject to this caveat – it is purely 
a benefit. 
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2. Materials and Methods 
Choice experiments (CEs) are a popular survey-based stated preference technique. In a CE, 
respondents choose one option out of sets of multiple options, each with different attributes varying 
at different levels, where price is one of the attributes (Bateman et al. 2002; Louviere et al. 2003; 
Champ et al. 2003). Willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA) is inferred 
indirectly by analysing how respondents trade off attributes against cost (Holmes and Adamowicz 
2003). The key advantage of CEs is the possibility of eliciting values for multiple attributes and 
options at once. However, CEs can add complexity to valuation (Bateman et al. 2002; Hanley, 
Mourato and Wright 2001; Foster and Mourato 2002). Although no stated preference study to date 
has examined the effect of E&S benefits in dynamic tariff choice, relevant studies exist on load-
shifting and dynamic tariff choice (MMI 2003 and Platchkov et al. 2011), electricity outages 
(Pepermans 2011; Carlsson and Martinsson 2008; Abdullah and Mariel 2010), and tariff choice 
(Goett et al. 2000). 
The complexity of electricity tariffs makes designing an appropriate CE difficult, especially 
for residential customers. Goett et al. (2000), for example, used over 40 different attributes, such as 
price, ‘greenness’, customer service, and additional services. The authors chose to accept ambiguity 
in some attributes to avoid technical complexity, and surveyed more sophisticated business 
customers. Taking a different tack for households, MMI (2003) focused exclusively on dynamic 
pricing and a pre-defined tariff set. By limiting the survey’s scope, the authors avoided complexity 
by designing tariffs that communicated cost, possible savings, and behaviours to get those savings 
(Lineweber 2012).  
We use a simple web-based choice experiment to elicit preferences for dynamic pricing. 
Our design drew on similar studies, especially Platchkov et al. (2011) and MMI (2003). 3 
Specifically, we use a labelled CE design (Fimereli and Mourato 2013) where we proxy the choice 
to switch from a fixed tariff to one of two dynamic tariffs: Time of Use (TOU) and Critical Peak                                                         
3 Survey design was also aided by comments from electric industry consultants, academics, and employees of 
electricity supply and distribution companies, a full list of whom can be found in the Acknowledgements section. 
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Pricing (CPP). 4  Together with the tariff label (i.e. fixed tariff, TOU or CPP), we provide a 
description (via words and graph) of the TOU and CPP tariffs as well as information on the actions 
required (e.g. shifting appliance usage away from system peak) and risks involved in obtaining the 
bill discount. Given the complexity of tariff-related information, we opted to vary only the price 
attribute. The price attribute was framed as an electricity bill discount (i.e. a WTA format) to 
switch to the dynamic tariff, and varied among 1%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%. This discount 
was displayed both in percentage and dollar savings based on bill information entered by 
respondents. 
Respondents were presented with four labelled choice cards.5 In each, they were asked to 
choose one among three tariffs – fixed, TOU or CPP – taking into account the information provided 
about the tariffs and the varying bill discount. To determine the effect of E&S benefits on customer 
switching, respondents were randomly divided into two sub-samples, with E&S benefits 
information presented to only one. Appendix B contains examples of choice cards both with and 
without E&S information. 
To model customer preferences for dynamic tariffs we estimated both a conditional and 
mixed logit model, consistent with other studies reviewed. These models allow the analyst to derive 
a model of the probability that a respondent will choose one tariff over another, and ultimately 
WTA, based on the attributes of the tariff and respondent. The conditional logit is a basic model; 
the mixed logit corrects many of the deficiencies of the conditional, but is more complex. See 
Appendix C for a technical treatment of these models. 
Besides the tariff choice section, the survey also elicited information on the following 
subjects: electricity usage; use of appliances, heating, and cooling; attitudes toward personal energy 
consumption and policy goals; tariff choice motivations; attitudes towards technologies and 
services; and demographic and socioeconomic information. Questions before the tariff choice                                                         
4 The market reflective Real Time Pricing tariff shown in Appendix A is not studied, as existing meta-analyses noted 
that residential participation in RTP programmes is generally low (DECC, 2013; Barbose et al., 2004). 
5 The full factorial of thirty-six possible dynamic tariff options was used. The options were randomly grouped into nine 
blocks of four choice cards, which were presented randomly to respondents (Holmes and Adamowicz 2003). 
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section were designed to warm up the respondent to think about energy usage and shifting 
activities. Demographic questions were left to the end to avoid protest responses. 
 The potential for hypothetical bias (i.e. differences between stated and true values) must be 
taken into account when conducting any stated preference study (Whitehead and Blomquist 2006). 
CE designs arguably mitigate against this type of bias to some extent as values are inferred 
indirectly (Hanley, Mourato and Wright 2001; Murphy et al. 2005). We also benefit from being 
able to proxy a real decision about a familiar product with a non-voluntary payment mechanism 
(Hanley et al. 2001). Moreover, we provide context: the survey’s purpose is to decide whether 
electricity retailers can offer these tariffs. 
3. Results 
The survey was implemented online at www.powershiftsurvey.com and ran for three weeks, 
from 9 to 31 July 2012. It was distributed through social media (e.g. Facebook) and email. A total 
of 160 usable responses were received. All respondents are residents of the US or EU, and currently 
pay one or more electricity bills. 88 respondents received the E&S benefits information treatment. 
This is a “convenient” sample and thus the study should be seen as a pilot with indicative results 
that should not be generalized. 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Demographic information is summarized in Table 3-1 below. The sample seems to be 
relatively balanced in terms of gender and region, with women slightly overrepresented. The group 
is young, with 50% being 25 years of age or below. The majority (nearly 88%) are well-educated, 
having completed an undergraduate, masters degree or more. 
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Table 3-1: Demographic and Socio-economic Data (n=160) 
Category Statistic Category Statistic 
Gender  Region  
   Female 58.8%    EU 
   US 
45.6% 
54.4% 
Age  Area Type  
   Min 19    Rural 1.9% 
   Max 70    Suburban 33.8% 
   Median 25    Urban 64.4% 
    
Highest Degree Completed  Housing Type  
   No Degree 0.0%    Dormitory 2.5% 
   High School 1.9%    Apartment  42.5% 
   Some University 10.6%    Single Family Home 42.5% 
   Undergraduate 35.0%    Multi Family Home 10.0% 
   Masters 48.1%    Other 2.5% 
   Doctorate 1.9%   
   Professional Degree 2.5% Conservation Organization Member (e.g. 
Sierra Club) 
 
     Yes 11.3% 
Current Student    
   Yes 55.0% Annual Pre-Tax Household Income  
     Less than $30,000 31.9% 
House Occupancy     $30,000 to $60,000 16.3% 
   w/ less than 7 years of age 10.0%    $60,001 to $110,000 21.9% 
   w/ 7 to 18 years of age 7.5%    $110,000 or more 21.3% 
   w/ 18 years of age or more 90.6%    Would rather not say 8.8% 
   Max Occupancy 10   
   Min Occupancy 1   
   Median Occupancy 3   
 
 
 
Attitudinal results show that our respondents strongly prefer environmentally friendly 
energy consumption and supply mix: around 90% would like their electricity usage to be as 
environmentally responsible as possible; 93% support renewable energy growth; and nearly 96% 
support homes and businesses energy efficiency. 88% support limiting greenhouse gases to 
mitigate climate change. Ensuring a reliable electricity supply and energy security are also popular 
policy goals for 84% and 74% respectively. 
Findings from our survey on use of heating and cooling systems indicate potential for load 
shifting. Air conditioning has the highest potential for shifting during the summer in the US: about 
90% of US respondents have central air conditioning, window units, or both. In the EU, electric 
heating has the highest shifting potential in winter: just over 70% of the sample has central electric 
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heating, ‘space’ heaters, or both.6 Appliance shifting applies to both regions. Dishwashers are used 
by over 58% of the group, washing machines by 91%, clothes dryers by nearly 60%, and electric 
cooking appliances by over 91%. Figure 3-1 shows usage of appliances by time of day. 
Respondents were found to have substantial appliance use from 5pm-12am, with more usage from 
5-8pm. This corresponds to the second half of peak time (2-8pm) and the period immediately after. 
Potential to shift does not necessarily imply willingness, although over 65% of respondents said it 
would be easy to shift their usage.  
 
Figure 3-1: Appliance Use Profile (n=160) 
 
Caption: Figure 3-1 shows respondents’ use of appliances by time of day. Respondents were found 
to have substantial appliance use from 5pm-12am, with more usage from 5-8pm. This corresponds 
to the second half of peak time (2-8pm) and the period immediately after. 
 
 
Average bill size was around $80 per month, with 53% paying this amount or less. A third 
of respondents claimed to be on a fixed tariff while another third did not know their tariff type. In 
                                                        
6 Use of heating and cooling systems tend to be higher for the surveyed group than among the general population in the 
US or EU. See Stamminger 2008, Table 3.11.1 for estimated penetrations of a variety of electric appliances and heating 
systems in European countries (pp 211-12). 
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the E&S benefit sub-sample, 14% of respondents indicated they were on a dynamic tariff already, 
this percentage was 21% in the treatment without E&S information.7 
3.2 Model results 
The variables used in the econometric analysis are described in Table 3-2. Three variables 
are labels or attributes of the choice experiment: the dynamic tariff labels TOU and CPP, and the 
attribute DISCOUNT. E&S is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent received the 
E&S benefits information or not. The remaining variables are customer attributes that enter the 
model as interactions with each of the tariff labels. 
 
Table 3-2: Variables used in the models 
Variable Description 
TOU Alternative-specific constant: 1 if respondent choose TOU 
CPP Alternative-specific constant: 1 if respondent choose CPP 
DISCOUNT Price Attribute: Continuous variable. Values presented to 
survey respondents were 1%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%. 
Variables used in interactions 
E&S Dummy variable: 1 if respondent was presented with 
environmental and system (E&S) benefits of dynamic 
tariffs, 0 otherwise 
MALE Dummy variable: 1 if male, 0 otherwise 
HIBILL Dummy variable: 1 if pay a bill over $80 per month, 0 
otherwise 
STUDENT Dummy variable: 1 if is currently in education, 0 otherwise 
EASY Dummy variable: 1 if considers shifting electricity use from 
peak (2-8pm) to off-peak (any other time)  “easy” or “very 
easy”, 0 otherwise 
 
Results of the conditional and mixed logit models are shown in Table 3-3. Observed 
heterogeneity in the group’s preferences towards dynamic pricing is further included by interacting 
each tariff with customer attributes. These interactions give insight into how different people 
respond to dynamic pricing, and also isolate the effect of E&S benefits. The interaction with E&S 
shows the impact of providing extra information on E&S benefits on preferences for dynamic 
pricing.                                                          
7 About 25% of respondents indicated they were on a tariff not commonly offered in the areas covered by the survey – 
the inclining block rate. We hypothesize that these responses were a misunderstanding and that these respondents were 
probably on fixed tariffs. 
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Table 3-3: Model Results with Customer Attribute Interactions 
 Model 1: Conditional Logit  Model 2: Mixed Logit 
 Coefficient Std. 
Error 
MWTAa Std. 
Errorb 
 Coefficient Std. 
Error 
MWTAa Std. 
Errorb 
DISCOUNT 0.079*** 0.010    0.163*** 0.020   
TOUc -0.865*** 0.308 11.05% 3.71%  -1.993** 0.830 12.22% 4.91% 
E&SxTOU 0.958*** 0.232 -12.24% 3.32%  1.599*** 0.622 -9.81% 3.87% 
MALExTOU -0.991*** 0.230 12.67% 3.31%  -1.779*** 0.627 10.91% 3.91% 
HIBILLxTOU 0.666*** 0.230 -8.51% 3.06%  1.255** 0.619 -7.70% 3.82% 
STUDENTxTOU -0.080 0.236 1.02% 3.03%  -0.056 0.629 0.34% 3.86% 
EASYxTOU 1.453*** 0.226 -18.57% 3.65%  2.848*** 0.657 -17.47% 4.19% 
CPPc -1.229*** 0.355 15.70% 4.34%  -3.009*** 1.039 18.45% 6.20% 
E&SxCPP 1.225*** 0.274 -15.65% 3.91%  2.086*** 0.788 -12.80% 4.87% 
MALExCPP -0.840*** 0.273 10.73% 3.71%  -1.437* 0.790 8.81% 4.88% 
HIBILLxCPP -0.016 0.270 0.20% 3.45%  -0.390 0.793 2.39% 4.86% 
STUDENTxCPP -0.886*** 0.274 11.32% 3.75%  -1.728** 0.804 10.60% 4.97% 
EASYxCPP 1.064*** 0.267 -13.60% 3.85%  1.981** 0.802 -12.15% 5.01% 
   Standard Deviations of Random Coeffs. 
TOU N/A N/A    2.776*** 0.381   
CPP N/A N/A    3.365*** 0.535   
Df   13     13  
Replications   N/A     1000  
Observations   1920     1920  
Log likelihood   -541.160     -438.380  
LR χ2  Coeffs 
(13) 
323.90***    SDs 
(2) 
205.56**
* 
 
 
Pseudo R2   0.230     N/A  
*p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01. 
a. Marginal WTA calculated as a bill discount (%). 
b. Std. Errors calculated using the Delta method (Hole 2007). 
c. Alternative-specific constant. 
 
A Likelihood Ratio test between Models 1 and 2 shows that the mixed logit Model 2 (Table 
3-3) provides a better fit for the data at the highest levels of significance (LR= 205.56 > χ2 (2) (.05) 
= 5.99). Going forward our discussion will focus on Model 2. In this model, the discount associated 
with a tariff is the WTA of a base individual: a non-student female with a low bill, who did not see 
E&S benefits, and does not find it easy to shift electricity consumption away from peak hours. Each 
interaction effect gives the increase or decrease in discount necessary to keep utility constant from 
the switch, in relation to the base person, holding all else constant.  
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4. Discussion 
4.1 Time of Use 
Model 2 results (Table 3-3) show that, for TOU, the base individual requires a 12.22% 
discount to switch from the fixed tariff. A male requires an additional 10.91% discount. Having a 
high bill reduces the necessary discount by 7.70%; we would intuitively expect this result, as a 
customer with a relatively large bill will see larger savings. This result also aligns with the 
description of a ‘likely taker’ from MMI (2003). Being a student has no statistically significant 
effect. On the other hand, having the attitude that shifting from peak times is easy has the largest 
effect on respondent WTA, cutting the discount needed by 17.47%. This result indicates that 
customers in this category will switch for almost any discount. Finally, respondents who were 
informed about E&S benefits had a 9.81% lower WTA for TOU, an effect second in size only to 
feeling shifting usage is easy. Interestingly, for the base customer, seeing E&S benefits puts WTA 
to switch to TOU very near zero, indicating the customer is indifferent between the two tariffs. 
Most of the WTA estimates have large standard errors, indicating heterogeneity in preferences. 
4.2 Critical Peak Pricing 
In line with expectations, our results show that the base respondent has a higher WTA to 
switch from fixed to CPP than to TOU: 18.45% (Model 2, Table 3-3). Male respondents have an 
8.81% higher WTA, slightly less than male WTA for TOU. Having a high bill has a statistically 
insignificant effect, at odds with the positive significant effect found for TOU and MMI (2003). 
The STUDENT interaction is significant for CPP, unlike for TOU, and increases WTA by 10.60%. 
It is possible that students respond negatively to CPP because of its complexity, as they may be 
inexperienced with paying bills. Feeling that shifting usage is easy cuts WTA by 12.15%, a smaller 
effect than for TOU. Finally, the disclosure of E&S benefits cuts the discount needed by 12.80%, 
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which is slightly larger than its effect on TOU. It causes the largest reduction of any interaction for 
CPP. Again, for all WTA estimates, large standard errors indicate heterogeneity in preferences.8 
 
Debriefing questions indicate respondents preferred TOU to CPP primarily due to the 
inconvenience associated with cutting substantial usage under CPP. The risk of bill increases is also 
a factor. A number of enabling technologies and services were offered free of charge to mitigate 
these concerns. A home battery that locked in savings of 5% for the TOU rate, but also 
automatically shifted usage, was the most popular. A bill analysis service and automatic usage-
shifting app were also seen favourably. Services that ceded customer control of shifting to the 
utility were seen unfavourably. 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This pilot study aimed to determine whether informing customers about E&S benefits of 
dynamic tariffs could potentially increase their adoption. We found that our environmentally 
conscious sample reduced their required discount to switch from a fixed to a dynamic tariff by 
around 10%, although the perception that shifting electricity use is easy to do also had a significant 
impact on the discount required. This second result indicates the important role that automated 
forms of shifting may play. We note however that sampling and design issues preclude 
generalization of these promising results. In this context, the current analysis should be viewed as a 
feasibility study for a larger study with a more representative sample. Our preliminary results 
indicate that this topic is worth investigating further. 
Should our results hold for a broader population, they indicate an opportunity for policy 
makers in the electricity sector to lower costs and achieve environmental goals by enabling                                                         
8 It is important to note that the overall magnitude of interaction effects, E&S benefit disclosure and otherwise, likely 
overstate the response of some customers. The authors ran additional models that included multiple interaction effects 
to examine the effect of E&S benefit exposure on different groups, such as customers with high bills. In some cases, 
the E&S benefit effect was muted if a customer already had a lower WTA to start (the case with customers with high 
bills). Thus, any combination that indicates a negative WTA (or WTP) to switch may be spurious – a result of the 
limiting assumption that all customers respond to E&S benefits in the same way. Further research with a larger sample 
size is needed to disentangle and quantify these effects. 
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electricity retailers to offer dynamic tariffs and services to households. To date, households have 
largely been viewed as passive participants in the electricity market, served under fixed price 
contracts that may or may not be adjusted to market conditions. Smart metering deployments allow 
customers to become more active participants in the electricity market through dynamic tariffs. 
However, customers have not opted into such tariffs in large enough numbers to justify meter 
deployment. E&S benefits are technically possible but not realized. 
Our results indicate these customers may be more receptive to dynamic tariffs if the E&S 
benefits of these tariffs are highlighted, and if enabling services such as automated shifting and 
batteries are bundled with electricity services. Thus, in order for the benefits of smart metering 
deployments to exceed their costs, regulators and retailers must focus on more than meters – they 
might need to understand customers’ motivations and concerns and move to address them through 
technology and information. 
More flexible household demand, especially if it is technology-enabled and dispatchable, 
can be a key tool for integrating high levels of  intermittent renewable energy and dealing with 
peaks in demand, as recognised by recent policy documents (DECC 2014). If the structure of the 
electric power sector shifts to meet new policy goals – incorporating new metering, tariffs, 
technologies, and clean generation – residential customers cannot be expected to actively 
participate if they are kept in the dark. Further research is necessary to understand how to connect 
with customers and what type of response to expect.
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Appendix A: Dynamic Pricing Examples 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustrations adapted from Faruqui et al. (2010) 
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Tariff Descriptions 
Fixed A fixed electricity tariff charges the same price (per kWh) for electricity 
over a set period of time. It does not change with day-to-day market 
conditions. 
Real Time 
Pricing (RTP) 
The "purest” variation is real time pricing (RTP), where the customer faces 
the actual cost of procuring electricity on the market, with price changes 
every hour or so. Price volatility makes RTP impractical for the residential 
market. 
Time of Use 
Pricing (TOU) 
TOU tariffs have pre-set, high-priced on-peak periods and lower prices 
during off-peak periods. TOU tariffs are the most prevalent form of 
dynamic pricing, but also have less of an impact on peak demand, as prices 
only approximate market conditions. 
Critical Peak 
Pricing (CPP) 
CPP tariffs create a better connection to wholesale prices and market 
conditions than TOU tariffs. On a pre-set number of days (around ten), the 
retail price of electricity rises substantially during the on-peak period of the 
day, anywhere from 500% to 1000%. Customers are notified shortly in 
advance, and face lower prices all other hours of the year to compensate. 
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Appendix B: Tariff Choice Cards 
 
Page 8a: Pre Choice Card Instructions 
Note: A respondent saw four cards in total. Each respondent saw either cards with E&S benefits or without, never a combination. 
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Page 8b: Choice Card Example without E&S Benefits ($100 per month bill) 
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Page 8b: Choice Card Example with E&S Benefits ($100 per month bill) 
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Appendix C: Technical Description of Models Used 
 
To model customer preferences for dynamic tariffs we estimated both a conditional and 
mixed logit model.*** Logit models treat the dependent variable as categorical, which is an 
accurate description of the discrete choice of a tariff. In such situations, logit models are 
preferred to general linear models, which treat the dependent variable as continuous. The logit 
family of models is derived from the random utility model (RUM) framework. Under RUM, 
representative or observed utility (Vnj) is a function of tariff (n) and respondent (j) attributes. 
True utility Unj. includes a representative utility and a stochastic component (εnj) (Carson et al. 
1994). Combining the two yields the following expression: 
𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  =  𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 +  𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
  For the standard conditional logit model, εnj is assumed to follow the independently, 
identically distributed extreme value (Gumbel) distribution. This allows an expression to be 
derived giving the probability that a respondent will choose one tariff over another. For the 
conditional logit, it can be concisely summarised as: 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = exp(𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)Σexp (𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) 
 The expression above can be used to derive the welfare measures of marginal WTA or 
WTP, depending on the context. The ratio of any non-price coefficient to the price coefficient 
(discount) gives marginal WTA or WTP holding utility constant – the compensating surplus 
(Hoyos 2010): 
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 = −𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
 (1 
There are some limiting assumptions to the conditional logit. First, in the most basic 
model, preferences are assumed to be homogenous across the respondents. Second, the model 
                                                        
*** The notation in this section draws from Train (2009). 
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assumes choices exhibit independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Finally, the model 
assumes unobserved factors are uncorrelated over a repeated panel of choices (Train 2009). 
 To relax these three assumptions, a mixed (or random parameters) logit is employed. 
The mixed logit is used in all tariff choice experiments reviewed since 1999. It assumes that at 
least one of the βxni’s estimated is not fixed, but varies over respondents in the population 
according to a distribution specified by the analyst: f(β). The standard logit probability 
expression is thus integrated over the distribution of possible preferences: 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = �� exp�𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�
Σ exp�𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛��𝑓𝑓(𝛽𝛽)𝑑𝑑𝛽𝛽 
Choosing which parameters are random and their distribution are the two key difficulties 
associated with the mixed logit. Random parameters were chosen by starting with all attributes 
as random and working backwards to identify those with standard deviations that are 
statistically significant, as suggested by Hensher and Greene (2003).††† In the mixed logit model 
the dynamic tariff labels, TOU and CCP are found to have highly significant standard 
deviations. As for choosing the random parameters’ distributions, we chose to model our tariff 
labels with normal distributions, which most recent applications assume (Carlsson and 
Martinsson 2008; Pepermans 2011).‡‡‡ In all mixed logit tariff applications that we reviewed 
since 1999, the price coefficient was fixed due to ease of interpretation and issues with defining 
an appropriate distribution (See Goett et al. 2000 for a full discussion).  
 
 
                                                        
††† McFadden and Train (2000) propose the Langrange Multiplier test to pick the random parameters. This more 
sophisticated approach is appropriate with large number of attributes. 
‡‡‡ Other distributions – log-normal, triangular, and uniform – are possible for the tariff attributes (especially log-
normal as their signs are unlikely to be positive). However, other distributions pose problems in inferring WTP or 
WTA (Hensher and Greene 2003). 
